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THE FUTURE OF THE EU27 
Federico Fabbrini
This article examines the future of the European Union (EU) beyond Brexit, 
contrasting the unity of the EU27 in the Brexit negotiations with the disunity that 
emerged among the EU27 in the management of the euro-crisis, migration crisis and 
rule of law crisis. The article overviews the efforts to restore a European consensus 
that have been made in the context of the debate on the future of Europe, but underlines 
how the emergence of strong regional alliances – and the political polarization 
resulting from the recent European Parliament elections – have challenged this 
rhetorical exercise. As such, the article considers alternative scenarios for the future of 
the EU27 and suggests that, while the strength of path dependency cannot be 
underestimated, the EU may be moving towards greater differentiation, if not 
outright decoupling among its Member States.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most remarkable aspects of Brexit – the decision of the United 
Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from the European Union (EU) – has been the 
degree to which the 27 other Member States of the EU (EU27) have been 
united in their dealings with the UK. Contrary to the expectations of some, 
the EU27 have never divided during the Brexit negotiations. With the 
marginal exception of Italy's legal challenge against the EU Council decision 
to relocate the European Medical Agency from London to Amsterdam, 
rather than Milan1 – the EU Member States have remained consistently 
united, delegating all Brexit talks to the ad hoc European Commission 
Article 50 Task Force, and backing the work of the Chief Negotiator Michel 
Barnier.2 Yet, one would be mistaken to believe that the unity of the EU27 
vis-à-vis the UK reflects a generally high level of harmony within the EU. In 
fact, during the two-year Brexit negotiations, tensions and contrasts among 
the EU27 have actually increased in a number of policy areas. Besides Brexit, 
the EU has recently faced several other important crises – from the euro-
crisis, to the migration crisis, and the rule of law crisis – which have tested the 
integrity of the Union, and raised urgent questions on the future of Europe. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the future of Europe beyond Brexit, 
examining the centrifugal pressures that recent crises have exerted on the 
EU27 and reflecting on the challenges that this poses for the future of 
European integration. In particular, the article focuses on the deep wounds 
that the euro-crisis, the migration crisis and the rule of law crisis have left in 
the fabric of the Union, highlighting growing divisions among the EU27 in 
 
1 See Regulation (EU) 2018/1718 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
November 2018 amending Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 as regards the location of 
the seat of the European Medicines OJ [2018] L291/3. 
2 See European Council Conclusions, EUCO XT 20015/18, 25 November 2018, §3 
(thanking 'Michel Barnier for his tireless efforts as the Union's chief negotiator and 
for maintaining the unity among EU27 Member States throughout the [Brexit] 
negotiations'). 
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the key fields of Economic & Monetary Union (EMU), migration, and 
respect for EU foundational values. Moreover, the article evaluates the 
degree to which such cleavages have been overcome in the context of the 
debate on the future of Europe. In fact, shortly after the June 2016 Brexit 
referendum, the EU27 started a process of self-reflection designed to build 
consensus on a common vision of the future ahead. Nevertheless, as this 
article underlines, this rhetorical reaction has not been able to bridge 
fractures among the EU27 – a fact confirmed by the growing tendency of 
states to caucus in regional coalitions pushing conflicting policy agendas, as 
well as by the increasing polarization of citizens' views as reflected in the 
recent elections for the European Parliament (EP) on 23-26 May 2019.  
This article considers several alternative scenarios for the EU's future. As the 
article points out, the impact of path dependency should certainly not be 
underestimated, meaning that a scenario in which the EU muddles through 
in its current format and resists all difficulties cannot be ruled out. 
Nevertheless, the article indicates that growing differentiation among the 
Member States – if not outright decoupling, with the creation to the side of 
the existing EU of a new, smaller union including only a minority of Member 
States – are possibilities which should not be excluded either. While the 
article does not seek to predict the future, which of course remains uncertain, 
it endeavors to conceptualize three alternative models of constitutional 
development in the EU, defining their features and highlighting the drivers 
of both continuity and change in the process of European integration. As 
such, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 examines three key crises 
recently challenging the EU – the euro-crisis, the migration crisis, and the 
rule of law crisis – and explains their centrifugal consequences on European 
unity. Section 3 looks at the efforts since Brexit to strengthen EU unity, 
underlining how the rise of regional alliances and political polarization has 
exposed continuing divisions within the EU27. Section 4 considers possible 
alternative scenarios for the future of Europe, and discusses path 
dependency, greater differentiation, or outright decoupling as three options. 
Section 5, finally, briefly concludes. 
 




Besides Brexit, the EU has recently been facing a plurality of other crises, 
which have tested the unity of EU27. In fact, since the start of the Brexit 
negotiations, tensions among the Member States have possibly even 
increased on issues such as the governance of EMU, the management of 
migration, and the respect for the foundational values of the EU. In 
particular, the euro-crisis and its legacy have caused a cleavage between 
Northern and Southern Member States; the migration crisis one between 
Western and Eastern Member States; and the rule of law crisis one between 
New and Old Member States. Hence, the united face of the EU vis-à-vis the 
UK effectively concealed a house divided, with multiple centrifugal pressures 
challenging the integrity of the Union.  
1. Euro-crisis 
The euro-crisis hit the EU well before Brexit. In fact, by the time of the 
Brexit referendum, the worst of the crisis had already been overcome: while 
the EU27 had reformed the architecture of European economic governance 
to tighten budgetary constraints and create mechanisms to financially 
support states,3 the European Central Bank (ECB) had taken decisive steps 
to save the Eurozone.4 Nevertheless, the crisis had a lasting legacy, tainting 
inter-state relations throughout the Brexit negotiations, and hampering 
efforts to deepen EMU, which to this day remains incomplete.5 To begin 
with, from an economic viewpoint, the crisis left a trail of divergence in the 
macro-economic performance of Member States, and EMU remains fragile 
due to low growth and high unemployment in some countries.6 This was 
evident in the case of Greece, which in 2018 ended with much fanfare its third 
bailout program but as part of the post-program surveillance framework was 
 
3 See further Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe (Oxford University 
Press 2016). 
4 See ECB President Mario Draghi, speech at the Global Investment Conference, 
London, 26 July 2012 (stating that the ECB will 'do whatever it takes to save the 
euro'). 
5 See Henrik Enderlein et al, 'Repair and Prepare: Growth and the Euro after Brexit', 
Bertelsmann Stiftung & Jacques Delors Institut 2016. 
6 Kerstin Bernoth et al, 'Happy Birthday? The euro at 20', study commissioned by 
the European Parliament Economic Affairs Committee, January 2019, 6.  
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then forced by the Eurogroup to commit to maintaining 'a primary surplus of 
2.2 per cent of GDP on average in the period from 2023 to 2060'7 – a target 
which most observers regarded as impossible to meet.8  
Moreover, from a political viewpoint, the crisis fueled recriminations and 
animosity between Member States.9 In fact, perceived unfairness in the 
architecture of EMU propelled forward political forces calling more 
explicitly for exiting the Eurozone – particularly in Italy, the third largest 
Eurozone economy. Following parliamentary elections in March 2018, the 
two parties which had emerged victorious – the Lega and the Movimento 5 
Stelle – joined in a sovereigntist coalition with an explicit plan to abandon the 
Eurozone.10 Only the veto of the Italian President of the Republic forced the 
coalition parties to backtrack.11 Yet the new Italian government clearly 
embraced a confrontational stand against the EU: in presenting its 2019 draft 
budget bill to the Commission pursuant to the procedure foreseen by the 
European semester, the government openly admitted that it was violating the 
EU deficit rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, which led the 
Commission to invoke for the first time ever its power to request a redrafting 
 
7 Eurogroup statement on Greece, 22 June 2018. 
8 See Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., 'How to Solve the Greek Debt Problem' Peterson 
Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 10/2018. 
9 See also French President Emmanuel Macron, speech, Athens, 7 September 2017 
(defining the euro-crisis as 'une forme de guerre civile interne [a form of internal 
civil war]') (my translation). 
10 See Alessandro Trocino, 'M5S-Lega, il contratto di governo: uscita dall'euro e 
cancellazione del debito', Il Corriere della Sera, 15 May 2018 (reporting a leaked draft 
of the coalition agreement between the League and the Movimento 5 Stelle 
including a plan to exit the Eurozone).  
11 See Italian President Sergio Mattarella, speech, Rome, 27 May 2018 (opposing the 
appointment as Minister of the Economy of a person 'che potrebbe provocare, 
probabilmente, o, addirittura, inevitabilmente, la fuoruscita dell'Italia dall'euro 
[who could provoke, probably or even inevitably, the exit of Italy from the euro') 
(my translation). 
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of the budget bill,12 and to activate the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).13 
Mostly under the pressure of the financial markets, the Italian Government 
temporarily compromised and agreed to revise its budget bill by postponing 
some expenditure to reduce the deficit.14 But this turned out just to be a 
stopgap and in June 2019 the Commission was again forced to threaten EDP 
sanctions against Italy for violating the debt criteria of the Stability & 
Growth Pact.15 
Given the decreasing trust between states, it is unsurprising that major 
difficulties have been encountered on the road towards completing EMU, 
including by setting up a fiscal capacity and the last pillar of banking union 
through a common European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS).16 In fact, 
while the efforts of French President Emmanuel Macron favored a 
convergence between France and Germany, which jointly proposed in 
November 2018 the establishment of a Eurozone budget with a stabilization 
function,17 a coalition of Northern countries known as the Hanseatic League, 
which groups both Eurozone and non-Eurozone states, came out to rally 
against the Franco-German proposal, calling instead for a strengthening of 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)18 as a 'police authority' on the 
 
12 European Commission opinion of 23 October 2018 on the draft budgetary plan of 
Italy and requesting Italy to submit a revised budgetary plan, 23 October 2018, 
C(2018) 7510 final. 
13 European Commission report on Italy prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 21 November 2018, 
COM(2018) 809 final. 
14 European Commission letter to the Government of Italy, 19 December 2018, 
Ares(2018) 7351969 (welcoming amendments to the Italian draft budget law to 
assuage the Commission's fiscal concerns). 
15 See European Commission report on Italy prepared in accordance with Article 
126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 5 June 2019, 
COM(2019) 532 final. 
16 See ECB President Mario Draghi, speech at the session of the plenary of the 
European Parliament to mark the 20th anniversary of the euro in Strasbourg, 15 
January 2019 (stating that 'EMU remains incomplete'). 
17 See Franco-German Proposal on the architecture of a Eurozone Budget within the 
Framework of the European Union, 16 November 2018. 
18 See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 25 March 2011. 
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Member States' budgets.19 In December 2018, the Eurogroup in an inclusive 
format (that is also open to non-Eurozone Member States) eventually agreed 
on a package deal of reforms,20 which the Euro Summit endorsed,21 including 
boosting the ESM's authority and the creation of a limited Eurozone budget. 
However, the EU27 reached a minimalist consensus22 and in June 2019 they 
unveiled a budgetary instrument only for competitiveness and convergence, 
but not stabilization23 and failed to make progress on the EDIS,24 suggesting 
that the North-South ideological divide between risk-reduction vs. risk-
sharing remains a stumbling block towards completing EMU.25   
2. Migration crisis 
Like the euro-crisis, the migration crisis had peaked by the time of the Brexit 
referendum. Although fears of uncontrolled migration into the UK were 
cynically exploited by the Brexiteers in the referendum campaign, by 2016 the 
EU had succeeded in reducing the inflow of people moving into the Schengen 
free-movement zone, at the cost of outsourcing to third countries (with 
dubious human rights records) the task of controlling the EU's external 
borders.26 Nevertheless, the management of the migration crisis has 
remained a point of contention among the Member States during the time of 
the Brexit negotiations and tensions over the functioning of the European 
 
19 Shared views from the Finance Minister of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden, 6 March 2018. 
20 Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU Deepening, 4 December 2018, PRESS 
738/18. 
21 Euro Summit statement, 14 December 2018, PRESS 790/18. 
22 Eurogroup President Mario Centeno, remarks, 13 June 2019. 
23 Council of the EU, Term sheet on the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and 
Competitiveness, 14 June 2019. 
24 See also European Commission Communication Deepening Europe's Economic 
and Monetary Union: Taking stock four years after the Five Presidents' Report – 
European Commission's contribution to the Euro Summit on 21 June 2019, 12 June 
2019, COM(2019) 279 final, 10 (stating, with regard to EDIS that 'regrettably, the 
impasse that characterized the past several years has persisted and no tangible 
progress has been made'). 
25 See further Federico Fabbrini and Marco Ventoruzzo (eds), Research Handbook on 
European Economic Law (Elgar 2019). 
26 See EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press release 144/16. 
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Common Asylum System (ECAS) have in fact increased.27 The EU migration 
policy had been developed in good time, but the Dublin regulation,28 which 
identified the Member State responsible for processing asylum applications 
of third-country nationals, was particularly ill-designed to cope with a sudden 
surge of asylum applications. Yet, the EU27 were dramatically divided on the 
issue of how to handle this crisis, with Central and Eastern European 
Member States refusing any form of burden sharing vis-à-vis the coastal 
Member States, which had been the main points of entry for immigrants.  
In September 2015, under the pressure of events, the Council adopted by 
majority a decision establishing a temporary relocation mechanism to the 
benefit of Greece and Italy, which foresaw the relocation of 160,000 asylum 
seekers to the other EU Member States pro-quota, with the aim of relieving 
Greece and Italy of the increasing workload resulting from the sudden inflow 
of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.29 Although this number 
was a drop in the ocean compared to the almost 4 million migrants who had 
entered the EU in 2015, Hungary and Slovakia challenged the Council 
decision in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). And although in September 
2017 the ECJ ruled that the Council had acted legally in adopting the decision 
by majority,30 the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechia and 
Slovakia) bluntly continued to refuse applying the Council decision. As the 
Commission had to acknowledge in June 2017 in its periodic report on the 
 
27 See generally Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in 
European Law (Oxford University Press 2015). 
28 See Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person, OJ [2013] L180/31. 
29 See Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of 
Greece, OJ [2015] L239/146 and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 
2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for 
the benefit of Italy and Greece OJ [2015] L248/80. 
30 See Case C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia & Hungary v. Council of the EU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:631 
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relocation system, progress in the implementation of the measure had been 
'insufficient'.31  
In fact, disagreement among the Member States within the Council 
paralyzed any efforts at reforming the ECAS and, despite the encouragement 
of the European Council,32 the Commission's proposals to overhaul the 
system33 – including by introducing a permanent relocation mechanism to 
increase its fairness – have gone nowhere. Furthermore, as in the case of 
EMU, the legacy of the crisis combined with the inequities of the system have 
fueled political movements which have explicitly called for drastic responses, 
including fully suspending Schengen and reintroducing national borders.34 
Ironically, this has happened not only in Northern Member States like 
Austria and Denmark, but also in coastline countries such as Italy and Spain, 
where xenophobic right-wing parties have gained momentum in national and 
regional elections. Nonetheless, the cleavage on the migration issue has 
mostly run on an East-West divide and the ideological conflict between EU 
Member States on how Europe should handle the migration crisis soured to 
the point that Luxembourg Minister of the Interior Jean Asselborn even 
suggested that Hungary should be expelled from the EU for the way it treats 
migrants.35 
3. Rule of law crisis 
Compared to the euro-crisis and the migration crisis, the third crisis got 
much worse in the midst of the Brexit negotiations. Even if the first signs of 
backsliding regarding respect for the rule of law in a number of EU Member 
States in Central and Eastern Europe were evident from the early 2010s, in 
the years after the UK voted to leave the EU the phenomenon known as the 
 
31 See European Commission Thirteen report on relocation and resettlement, 13 June 
2017, COM(2017) 330 final. 
32 See European Council conclusions 28 June 2018, EUCO 9/18, §12 (calling for a 
'speedy solution to the whole package' of reforms). 
33 See European Commission communication, A European Agenda on Migration, 13 
May 2015, COM(2015) 240 final. 
34 See European Commission communication, Preserving and strengthening 
Schengen, 27 September 2017, COM(2017) 570 final. 
35 Madeline Chambers & Marton Dunai, 'EU should expel Hungary for mistreating 
migrants, Luxembourg minister says', Reuters, 13 September 2016. 
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rule of law crisis both deepened and widened.36 Although Article 2 TEU 
proclaims that the EU 'is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities' several EU Member 
States, particularly among those that joined the EU in the 2004/7 
enlargements, have experienced legal and political developments that have 
challenged basic constitutional principles such as the independence of the 
judiciary, separation of powers, and the fairness of the electoral process.37 
Such developments constitute a major threat to the integrity of the EU. Yet 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán proudly defended this path, 
explicitly arguing that his country was intent on establishing an authoritarian 
democracy.38 The Hungarian example has increasingly served as a template 
for other new Member States which had joined the EU in the 2004/7 
enlargements, notably Poland and Romania, but also Slovakia and Malta.39 
Although arguably with excessive delay, the EU institutions have started to 
take action against this phenomenon with the support of several other 
Member States and the main European political parties. In particular, as part 
of the preparatory work for the next multi-annual EU budget, the 
Commission proposed to introduce a mechanism to freeze structural funds 
for EU Member States which failed to respect the rule of law.40 In addition, 
in December 2017 the Commission activated the Article 7 TEU procedure 
against Poland, calling on the Council to determine that the country faced a 
 
36 See generally Andras Jakab and Dimity Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law 
and Values (Oxford University Press 2017). 
37 See Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law 
Backsliding in the EU' (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3. 
38 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, speech at the XXV. Bálványos Free 
Summer University and Youth Camp, 26 July 2014 (stating that 'the new state that 
we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state'). 
39 See European Parliament resolution of 28 March 2019 on the situation of the rule 
of law and the fight against corruption in the EU, specifically in Malta and Slovakia, 
P8_TA(2019)0328. 
40 European Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised 
deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, 2 May 2018, 
COM(2018) 324 final. 
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clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law.41 And in September 2018 the 
EP approved a resolution to initiate the same process against Hungary.42 
Nevertheless, limited progress has been made by the Council in considering 
whether the situation in Poland and Hungary require an EU determination 
that corrective action is necessary. In fact, in the first semester of 2019, when 
the Presidency of the Council was held by Romania – a Member State which 
had been strongly criticized by the EP for its rule of law record and limited 
efforts to fight corruption43 – the discussion of the Article 7 procedure 
against Poland and Hungary was even removed from the agenda of the 
General Affairs Council meeting.44  
In this context, the ECJ was also involved in the matter. Seized through a 
preliminary reference by the Irish High Court, the ECJ held that backsliding 
regarding respect for the rule of law – if this resulted in the reduction of the 
due process rights of a convicted person, to be assessed cases by case – could 
justify a judicial decision not to execute a European Arrest Warrant toward 
Poland.45 In addition, ruling in an infringement proceeding brought by the 
Commission, the ECJ enjoyed Poland from giving effect to a highly 
controversial law which altered the composition of the state Supreme 
Court.46 Yet, while the ECJ has so far managed to command respect, its 
 
41 European Commission reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) Treaty on 
European Union for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a 
serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, 20 December 2017, 
COM(2017) 835 final. 
42 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the 
Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, 
the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which 
the Union is founded, P8_TA(2018)0340. 
43 European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in 
Romania, P8_TA(2018)0446. 
44 See General Affairs Council, Outcome of meeting, 8 January 2019, Doc 5039/19. 
45 See Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.  
46 Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. Poland, Order of the Vice-President of the Court, 
19 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:910 (ordering the immediate suspension of the 
application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the 
retirement age for Polish Supreme Court judges); Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. 
Poland, Opinion of AG Tanchev, 11 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:325; Case C-
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ability to halt the erosion of the rule of law based system at the national level 
is likely to face challenges in the long term, given the absence of EU coercive 
power and the growing rise of populism across Europe. In fact, while the rule 
of law crisis has mostly polarized Old vs. New Member States, the formation 
of sovereigntist, Euro-skeptic government coalitions in an ever greater 
number of EU Member States – including Austria and Italy – makes it 
unlikely the EU intergovernmental institutions will mobilize to respond to 
domestic threats to the rule of law in forms analogous to what was done at the 
time of the Haider affair,47 casting dark shadows on the future functioning of 
the EU.  
III. REACTIONS AND FRACTURES 
Facing the first case of disintegration with a Member State intent on leaving 
the EU, the EU27 have since Brexit endeavored to reaffirm European unity 
with a number of initiatives designed to build consensus on a common way 
forward. However, this rhetorical exercise has run afoul of the reality of 
actions taken by groups of Member States caucusing in regional blocs: this 
has exposed conflicting strategies to deal with the EU's multiple crises and 
increasingly irreconcilable visions on the future of Europe. In fact, the 
cleavages cutting through the EU27 were ultimately reflected in the May 2019 
EP elections, which revealed growing polarization among EU Member States 
and citizens. 
1. The Debate on the Future of Europe and the Leaders' Agenda 
While the EU27 had already reaffirmed their unity in the face of Brexit in 
September 2016,48 the process of reflection on the future of Europe was 
formally started in connection with both the 60th anniversary of the Treaties 
of Rome and the UK's notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU. 
 
619/18 R, Commission v. Poland, judgment of the Court, 24 June 2019 (finding the 
Polish law in breach of EU law). 
47 Wojciech Sadurski, 'Adding Bite to Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. 
Enlargement, and Jörg Haider' (2010) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 385. 
48 Bratislava Declaration, 16 September 2016. 
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As described elsewhere,49 in February 2017 the EP adopted a package of 
resolutions outlining its vision for the future of the EU,50 in March 2017 the 
European Commission published a whitepaper on the future of Europe,51 and 
in the same month the leaders of the EU institutions and Member States 
signed a declaration in Rome pledging their support for European integration 
and defining the 'Union [a]s undivided and indivisible'.52 Along the same 
lines, the European Commission promoted a broad public deliberation on 
the future of Europe,53 and the President of the European Commission Jean-
Claude Juncker used his final state of the union addresses before the EP in 
2017 and 2018 to call for a stronger, more united, and more democratic 
Union,54 and to make the case for European sovereignty as a vision for the 
future.55 
However, given the strategic nature of the challenges faced by the EU it has 
mainly been within the European Council – as the institution responsible for 
defining the general political direction of the EU – that efforts were made to 
address the EU's crises and chart a united way forward at 27. In October 2017, 
in particular, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk launched 
a new working method known as the 'Leaders Agenda', which foresaw a more 
structured conversation among national leaders around thematic issues – 
including migration, trade, internal and external security, and economic 
affairs – with the aim of 'resolving deadlocks or finding solutions to key 
 
49 Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 
2017). 
50 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning 
of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, 
P8_TA(2017)0049 and European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on 
possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the 
European Union, P8_TA(2017)0048 
51 European Commission, whitepaper 'The Future of Europe', 1 March 2017. 
52 Rome Declaration of the leaders of 27 Member States and of the European 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 25 March 2017. 
53 See European Commission, Citizens' Dialogue and Citizens' Consultations: Key 
conclusions, 30 April 2019. 
54 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address 
2017, Brussels, 13 September 2017. 
55 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address 
2018, Brussels, 12 September 2018. 
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political dossiers'.56 In November 2017, the EU27 gathered in Goteborg, 
Sweden, to proclaim the European Pillar of Social Rights, a set of 20 non-
binding principles designed to reaffirm the EU commitment to a social 
Europe. Moreover, under the leadership of the President of the EP, Antonio 
Tajani, the heads of state and government of the EU27 were invited to 
present their vision of the future of Europe in front of the EP plenary in the 
build-up to the EP elections. Starting with Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar in 
January 2018,57 the 16 months before the EP election recess saw the Prime 
Ministers and Presidents of 20 Member States present to the EP their 
national priorities and programs for the future of Europe.58  
This process of reflection culminated in a special summit held on Europe 
Day, 9 May 2019, in Sibiu, Romania where EU leaders approved a declaration 
on the future of Europe.59 Days before the EP elections, the Presidents of the 
EU political institutions and the heads of state and government of the EU27 
reaffirmed their conviction that 'united, we are stronger in this increasingly 
unsettled and challenging world'60 and spelled out ten commitments 'of a new 
Union at 27 ready to embrace its future as one'.61 The first among these 
 
56 European Council, Leaders Agenda, 17 October 2017. 
57 Irish PM Leo Varadkar, speech Strasbourg, 17 January 2018. 
58 Croatian PM Andrej Plankovic, speech Strasbourg 6 February 2018; Portuguese 
PM Antonio Costa, speech Strasbourg, 14 March 2018; French President 
Emmanuel Macron, speech Strasbourg, 17 April 2018; Belgian PM Charles Michel, 
speech Strasbourg, 3 May 2018; Luxembourg PM Xavier Bettel, speech Strasbourg, 
30 May 2018; Dutch PM Mark Rutte, speech Strasbourg, 13 June 2018; Polish PM 
Mateusz Morawiecki, speech Strasbourg, 4 July 2018; Greek PM Alexis Tsipras, 
speech Strasbourg, 11 September 2018; Estonian PM Juri Ratas, speech Strasbourg, 
3 October 2018; Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, speech Strasbourg, 23 
October 2018; German Chancellor Angela Merkel, speech Strasbourg, 13 
November 2018; Danish PM Lars Lokke Rasmussen, speech Strasbourg, 28 
November 2018; Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades, speech Strasbourg, 12 
December 2018; Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez, speech Strasbourg, 16 January 2019; 
Finnish PM Juha Sipilä, speech Strasbourg, 31 January 2019; Italian PM Giuseppe 
Conte, speech Strasbourg, 12 February 2019, Slovak PM Peter Pellegrini, speech 
Strasbourg 7 March 2019; Swedish PM Stefan Lofven, speech Strasbourg, 3 April 
2019; Latvian PM Krišjānis Kariņš, speech Strasbourg, 17 April 2019. 
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commitments was a pledge, echoing the Declaration on the Reunification of 
Europe signed in Warsaw on 1 May 2019 by the 13 new Member States that 
had joined the EU since 2004,62 to 'defend one Europe – from East to West, 
from North to South',63 honoring the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the 15th anniversary of the major enlargement into Central and 
Eastern Europe. Furthermore, on the same day,  the heads of state of 21 
Member States (those with an elected president rather than a monarch) 
signed a joint call for Europe ahead of the EP elections, which stated that 
'unity is essential and that we want to continue Europe as a Union'.64  
2. Regional Caucuses and National Initiatives 
Despite repeated rhetorical calls to unity, however, the EU has recently 
witnessed a growing tendency among Member States to caucus in regional 
groupings, pushing conflicting policy agendas. In particular, besides well-
known formats such as the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg) or the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Visegrad 
group (bringing together Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia) emerged as 
a powerful lobby to resist any form of burden-sharing in the management of 
the migration crisis.65 In response, seven Southern countries (Portugal, Spain, 
France, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) established in 2016 the Euro-Med 
group, which met recurrently to call instead for greater EU solidarity.66 At 
the same time, under the leadership of Austria, ten Balkan states – which 
included both EU and non-EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) but excluded 
Greece – met informally in 2016 to discuss how to halt migration via the 
South-Eastern European route. And, as mentioned, at the behest of the 
Netherlands, a group known as the Hanseatic League – which included both 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone members (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, 
 
62 See Warsaw Declaration on the Reunification of Europe, 1 May 2019. 
63 Sibiu Declaration, 9 May 2019. 
64 Joint Call for Europe ahead of the European Parliament elections in May 2019, 9 
May 2019. 
65 See http://www.visegradgroup.eu/. 
66 See https://www.southeusummit.com/about/. 
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Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, as well as at times Czechia and Slovakia) – 
coalesced to resist EMU reforms. 
In the context of this increasing regional fragmentation, an important 
counter-point was offered by the re-starting of the Franco-German 
integration engine, thanks to the effort of the new French President 
Emmanuel Macron. In January 2018, at the occasion of the 55th anniversary 
of the 1963 Elysee Treaty, France and Germany committed to an agenda of 
growing political, economic and social convergence,67 and in June 2018 they 
concluded in Meseberg a declaration on the future of Europe with a specific 
roadmap to deepen integration in the fields of security and defense, 
migration and economic policy, including completing EMU.68 On this basis, 
in November 2018 the Minister of Finance of the two countries brought 
forward specific proposals for a Eurozone budget,69 which were followed by 
common positions in the field of digital tax70 and competition policy.71 And 
while the Assemblée Nationale and the Bundestag resolved to establish a 
joint Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly, designed to 'draft 
propositions on all questions of interest for franco-german relations with the 
aim to go towards a convergence of French and German law,'72 renewed 
Franco-German cooperation reached its climax with the conclusion in 
January 2019 of the Treaty of Aachen, which paved the way for ever greater 
socio-economic and cross-border integration between the two countries as a 
way to push Europe forward.73  
 
67 See Déclaration conjointe à l'occasion du 55e anniversaire de la signature du Traité 
sur la coopération franco-allemand du 22 janvier 1963, 22 January 2018.  
68 Franco-German Declaration, Meseberg, 19 June 2018. 
69 See n 17. 
70 Franco-German Joint Declaration on the taxation of digital companies and 
minimum taxation, 4 December 2018. 
71 Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st century, 
19 February 2019. 
72 Accord parlamentaire franco-allemand, 25 March 2019, Art. 6 (‘formuler des 
propositions sur toute question intéressant les relations franco-allemandes en vue 
de tendre vers une convergence des droits français et allemande’)(my translation). 
73 Traité entre la République française et la République fédérale d'Allemagne sur la 
coopération et l'intégration franco-allemand, Aachen [hereinafter: Treaty of 
Aachen], 22 January 2019. 
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In fact, since his election in May 2017, French President Macron has emerged 
as the leading figure advancing an ambitious vision for the future of Europe. 
In particular, in his speech at Sorbonne University in September 2017, he 
made a passionate case in favor of true European sovereignty as a way for the 
EU to face the challenges of the new century,74 a point he subsequently 
repeated in May 2018, when receiving the Prix Charlemagne,75 and in 
November 2018, when speaking in the Bundestag on the occasion of the 
100th anniversary of the end of World War I.76 Yet, significantly for an 
initiative which was officially entitled ’For a sovereign, united, democratic 
Europe', President Macron admitted that it was unlikely that the EU27 could 
move in this direction together and clarified that if no state should be 
excluded, 'no country should be able to block those who want to move further 
and faster'.77 In fact, Macron's vision, while supported by some,78 has come to 
represent the target of public attacks by self-proclaimed populist leaders – 
including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Italian Deputy Prime 
Minister Matteo Salvini, and Polish leader Jarosław Kaczyński – who have 
advanced an alternative, sovereigntist plan for the future of Europe.79 
3. European Parliament Elections 
The clash between these conflicting visions of the future of Europe was 
vividly reflected in the elections for the 9th EP, which took place between 23 
and 26 May 2019.80 In the second largest democratic exercise in the world 
(after India) pro and anti-European parties fought explicitly on alternative 
 
74 French President Emmanuel Macron, speech at Universitè La Sorbonne 'Pour une 
Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique’, 26 September 2017. 
75 French President Emmanuel Macron, speech at the award of the Prix 
Charlemagne, Aachen, 11 May 2018. 
76 French President Emmanuel Macron, speech at the Bundestag on the 
commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, Berlin, 18 
November 2018. 
77 Macron (n 74) (‘aucun pays ne doit pouvoir bloquer ceux qui veulent avancer plus 
vite ou plus loin’)(my translation). 
78 See German Minister of Finance Olaf Scholz, speech Humboldt Universität, 
Berlin, 28 November 2018. 
79 See Barbara Fiammeri, 'Salvini da Kaczyński: al via il ‘progetto' sovranista in UE', 
Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 January 2019. 
80 See 2019 European elections result, available at: https://www.election-results.eu/  
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visions of Europe. While French President Macron took up the leadership of 
the pro-European forces, addressing an open letter to all European citizens 
(written in the 22 official languages of the EU) pour un renaissance européenne,81 
sovereigntist forces made clear their ambition to take control of the EU 
machine and fundamentally weaken the system from within. In fact, during 
spring 2019 tensions between pro-European and Euro-skeptic forces soured 
to the point that they spilled over from the political to the diplomatic realm: 
In an unprecedented move, France recalled its ambassador from Italy after 
the Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi di Maio, leader of the Movimento 5 
Stelle, met the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Gillet Jaunes movement, 
which had openly suggested staging a military coup d'état against French 
President Macron.82  
The EP elections,83 in which the UK also eventually participated, constituted 
a political watershed, confirming a sentiment that had been captured by the 
Spring 2019 Eurobarometer.84 To begin with, for the first time since 1979, the 
two political families which had traditionally dominated the EP – the 
European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) – lost 
a majority of 751 EP seats.85 By contrast, the elections resulted in impressive 
gains for liberal democratic and environmentalist parties – which increased 
their EP seats, respectively, from 67 to 105, and from 50 to 69 – as well as by 
sovereigntist and populist forces. While pro-European parties managed 
overall to cling on to control of the EU institutions – mostly thanks to the 
sudden rise in electoral participation, which increased almost 10 per cent 
compared to 2014 – the vote strengthened the anti-European factions within 
 
81 French President Emmanuel Macron, Letter, 4 March 2019, available at: 
https://www.elysee.fr/es/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/pour-une-renaissance-
europeenne.fr 
82 See 'La France rappelle son ambassadeur en Italie à la suite d'« attaques sans 
précédent »', Le Monde, 7 February 2019. 
83 See for all data 2019 European elections results, available at: https://election-
results.eu/  
84 Eurobarometer Spring 2019, 25 April 2019. 
85 Corinne Deloy, 'La progression des populistes est contenue par la hausse des 
libéraux et des écologistes aux élections européennes', Fondation Robert 
Schuman, June 2019. 
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the EP, with conservatives, populists and nationalist parties now holding 63, 
43 and 73 EP seats apiece. 
Nevertheless, the election also exposed relevant national variation. In 
particular, in Hungary and Poland the governing right-wing parties, Fidesz 
and PiS, topped the polls with 53 per cent and 45 per cent of the vote 
respectively, while in Italy the Lega, a nationalist party lead by fire-brand 
Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini won the national vote with 34 per cent 
support and 28 EP seats. By contrast, S&D parties performed well in Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands, and the EPP won the elections in Ireland, 
Greece and Germany, where Die Grünen (the Greens) emerged as the biggest 
electoral surprise, coming in second place with 20 per cent of the vote. 
Moreover, while in France President Macron's movement trailed Marine Le 
Pen's Rassamblement nationale (National Rally), pro-European forces overall 
secured a higher number of EP seats, thanks again to a surprising 
performance by environmentalist parties, which secured 13 per cent of the 
vote. 
The fragmentation in the composition of the 10th EP, combined with the 
ideological and regional cleavages reflected in the elections, complicated the 
start of the new institutional cycle, with the appointment of new EU leaders 
and the adoption of a new strategic agenda for the EU. As regards the former, 
two meetings on 20 June 201986 and on 1 July 201987 were not enough for the 
European Council to reach a compromise on the nominees for the top EU 
jobs.88 Regarding the latter, the EU27, with input from the European 
Commission89 and the President of the European Council,90 managed to map 
 
86 See European Council President Donald Tusk, statement, 20 June 2019. 
87 See European Council President Donald Tusk, statement, 1 July 2019. 
88 See European Council Conclusions, 2 July 2019, EUCO 18/19 (nominating Ursula 
von der Leyen as President of the European Commission). 
89 See also European Commission contribution to the informal EU27 leaders' 
meeting in Sibiu Romania on 9 May 2019, Europe in May 2019: Preparing for a 
more united stronger and more democratic Union in an increasingly uncertain 
world, 30 April 2019. 
90 See European Council, Leaders' Agenda: Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – outline, 8 
May 2019. 
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a strategic agenda for 2019-2024,91 but this was so lacking in detail, as a 
condition to keep all Member States on board, as to look almost empty. In 
this context, it is worth noting that the liberal democratic group within the 
EP decided to rename itself 'Renew Europe', while the main sovereignist 
force has called itself 'Identity & Democracy', suggesting that a strong 
polarization will characterize the functioning of the EP in its 9th term. 
IV. SCENARIOS 
The crises described in section 2 have created centrifugal pressures 
challenging the unity of the EU. At the same time, the reactions since the 
Brexit referendum surveyed in section 3 have not bridged these cleavages: 
despite the rhetorical exercise of the debate on the future of Europe, the 
emergence of strong regional alliances, and the polarization in the EP 
elections confirmed the existence of strong fractures within the EU and of 
conflicting visions of integration. In this context, a number of scholars and 
commentators have started to reflect critically and constructively on several 
possible scenarios for the future of the EU,92 many of which imply a greater 
differentiation among, if not outright decoupling between, EU Member 
States. Yet, one should not underestimate the dynamics of path dependency 
within the EU. In what follows, three possible competing models of future 
integration are outlined. 
1. Path Dependency 
One cannot exclude that, despite all the challenges the EU is currently facing, 
things may simply continue as they have done previously. After all, the EU is 
not new to weathering crises. In fact, crises have been a recurrent feature in 
the history of the EU, from De Gaulle's Empty Chair93 to the failure of the 
 
91 See European Council Conclusions, 20 June 2019, EUCO 9/19, Annex I: A New 
Strategic Agenda. 
92 See e.g. Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Penn Press 2017); George Soros, 'How to Save 
Europe', Project Syndacate, 29 May 2018; and Alberto Estella, 'EU Scenarios for 
2027', Real Istituto Elcano WP 19/2018. 
93 See Piers Ludlow, 'Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966', (1999) 8 
Contemporary European History 231. 
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European Constitution94 and beyond. Hence, the EU may simply be able to 
resist yet another set of crises and muddle through. In fact, there are a 
number of policy areas where the EU is actually delivering – effectively – with 
its current governance and policy structures. In the field of international 
trade, for example, the EU has been able to achieve its objectives successfully. 
In the last five years, the EU has initiated a major free trade agreement with 
Japan95 and started negotiations for new economic partnerships with, among 
others, Australia.96 Moreover, despite a challenge by the Belgian region of 
Wallonia,97 the EU Council signed a comprehensive economic trade 
agreement with Canada98 and the European Commission received a mandate 
to start new trade negotiations with the US,99 averting (so far) the threats of 
a tariff war with the Trump administration.100 
The fact that the EU works – at least in some policy areas – is not irrelevant, 
as it strengthens the status quo and reduces the impetus for reform. In fact, 
as economists have shown, institutional systems follow a logic of path 
dependency, and reforms usually occur only when they are 'Pareto-optimal'. 
Path dependency means that once an economic process or a governance 
arrangement is in place over-time, it becomes locked-in and it will be difficult 
to change it, as institutional actors become accustomed to the status quo.101 
Pareto-optimality refers to a state of allocation of resources from which it is 
impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference 
criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference 
criterion worse off: this means that improvements to a given equilibrium can 
 
94 See Nick Barber et al (eds), The Rise and Fall of the European Constitution (Hart 2019). 
95 See EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. 
96 See European Commission press release, 'EU and Australia launch talks for a broad 
trade agreement', 18 June 2018, IP/18/4164. 
97 Opinion 1/17 on CETA, Judgment of 30 April 2019, (fining CETA's mechanism for 
the settlement of disputes between investors and states as compatible with EU 
law). 
98 See EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement OJ [2017] L11/23. 
99 See Council decision of 15 April 2019 authorizing the opening of negotiations with 
the United States of America for an agreement on the elimination of tariffs for 
industrial goods, Doc 6052/19. 
100 Joint EU-US Statement, 25 July 2018, STATEMENT/18/4687. 
101 See Kurt Dopfer, 'Toward a Theory of Economic Institutions: Synergies and Path 
Dependency' (1991) 25 Journal of Economic Issues 535. 
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only occur if no one loses out of the change. Applied to the EU, these insights 
suggest that reforming the EU at 27 will be a daunting task if states and EU 
institutions are accustomed to existing governance practices, and if reform 
scenarios threaten to make some countries worse off, given the requirement 
that any amendment to the EU Treaties be made by unanimous consent.102 
However, one cannot underestimate the novelty of the challenges the EU is 
facing today. Moreover, the ability of the EU to work in given areas, such as 
international trade, conceals the fact that this is a special domain where the 
institutional structures of the EU actually support effective governance. In 
fact, the EU treaties  make the common commercial policy an exclusive 
competence of the EU,103 vesting the power to handle international 
negotiations in the European Commission, subject to the mandate of the 
Council, which operates under qualified majority voting, and to the oversight 
of the EP.104 Yet, in most other areas of high politics, the EU does not follow 
the same supranational logic. On the contrary, intergovernmental modes of 
governance generally prevail, with the European Council mostly in charge of 
decision-making. As is well known, this has led to paralysis and increased 
inter-state tensions, since intergovernmental institutions are unable to 
overcome the conflicting national interests of the Member States and thus 
solve the problems at hand.105 In this context, it is not clear that states will 
have an interest in maintaining the status quo, or that the system will be 
strong enough to withstand pressures for change.106 
2. Differentiation 
It is for these reasons that an alternative scenario is one of increasing 
differentiation within the EU, a mode of integration which tries to reconcile 
heterogeneity within the EU by allowing Member States to participate in 
 
102 See Art. 48 TEU. 
103 Art. 3 TFEU. 
104 Art. 207 TFEU. 
105 See Federico Fabbrini, 'Constitutional Crisis and Institutional Reform: The 
European Union at the Crossroad' (2017) 32 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 285. 
106 Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter, 'The European Union in Disequilibrium', 
(2019) Journal of European Public Policy 3. 
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specific EU policies on a voluntary basis.107 Differentiation is by no means 
new to the EU, as it finds its roots in the Treaties of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam and the establishment of opt-outs (notably on euro-
membership) and closer cooperation (including in the field of defense).108 
Nevertheless, in recent times differentiated integration has increasingly 
become a tool to deal with deadlock and diverging ideological preferences in 
highly salient policy areas.109 For instance, the project of establishing a 
European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO)110 to investigate transnational 
crimes against the financial interests of the EU moved forward through 
enhanced cooperation with the support of only 20 Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Not surprisingly, among the non-
participating Member States are Poland and Hungary, two countries subject 
to the Article 7 procedure.111 The efforts by the Romanian government to 
oppose the appointment of a Romanian anti-corruption prosecutor to lead 
EPPO112 signaled how differentiation in policy areas connected to the area of 
freedom, security and justice is perhaps inevitable at a time when the rule of 
law is under threat in a number of Member States. 
The idea of embracing differentiation as a strategy to pursue integration at 
challenging times has been officially endorsed not only by the Commission, 
as one of its scenarios for the Future of Europe,113 but also by several states, 
including the Eurozone big four: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.114 In fact, 
 
107 See generally Alex Stubb, 'A Categorization of Differentiated Integration', (1996) 
34 Journal of Common Market Studies 283. 
108 See Bruno De Witte et al (eds), Between Flexibility and Disintegration (Elgar 2017). 
109 See also Maria Demertzis et al., 'One size does not fit all: European Integration by 
Differentiation', Bruegel Policy Brief 3/2018. 
110 See Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office OJ 
[2017] L283/1. 
111 See n 41-42. 
112 See Kit Gillet, 'Ex Corruption Fighter in Romania, Shortlisted for Top E.U. Job, 
Faces Foes at Home', The New York Times, 10 February 2019. 
113 European Commission whitepaper (n 51). 
114 See Déclaration au Sommet informel Allemagne, Espagne, France, Italie à 
Versailles, 6 March 2017. 
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France recently launched a form of differentiation to break the deadlock at 
EU level in setting up a solidarity-based system to manage the migration 
influx, by striking a deal with 13 other EU Member States on a voluntary 
basis.115 Even the EP, albeit with some reluctance, referred to differentiated 
integration in an ad hoc resolution in January 2019.116 As it pointed out, 
differentiated integration 'has sometimes allowed for the deepening and 
widening of the EU to be pursued simultaneously'.117 As a consequence, the 
EP underlined that 'one cannot oppose differentiation and integration, nor 
can one present differentiation as an innovative path for the future of the 
Union'.118 Nonetheless, noting that differentiation 'is often perceived as a 
path towards the creation of first- and second-class Member States',119 it 
concluded that 'that differentiation should only be conceived of as a 
temporary step on the path towards more effective and integrated 
policymaking.'120 
Whatever the benefits of differentiation, it is well known that this strategy 
suffers from a number of difficulties, not least the risk of actually being 
unable to effectively differentiate. The case of cooperation in the field of 
defense is telling from this point of view.121 Following the decision of the UK 
to leave the EU, the European Council eventually agreed for the first time in 
June 2017 on the need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defense pursuant to Article 
42(6) TEU.122 In December 2017, the Council formally approved the creation 
of PESCO on the understanding that Member States participating in the 
military cooperation 'shall make contributions which fulfill the more binding 
 
115 'Migrants: 14 pays européens s'accordent sur un ‘mécanisme de solidarité'', 
France24, 22 July 2017. 
116 European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2019 on differentiated integration, 
P8_TA-PROV(2019)0044. 
117 Ibid., §E. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., §C. 
120 Ibid., §3. 
121 See Federico Fabbrini, 'Do NATO Obligations Trump European Budgetary 
Constraints?' (2018) 9 Harvard National Security Journal 121. 
122 See European Council Conclusions, 22-23 June 2017, EUCO 8/17, §8. 
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commitments which they have made to one another'.123 In March 2018, the 
Council gave its blessing to the first operational projects.124 Nevertheless, the 
heterogeneity of the 25 participating Member States, all except Denmark and 
Malta, quickly diluted the impact of the project, leading France – the EU 
Member State with traditionally the greater strategic culture and military 
projection, as confirmed by its seat within the UN Security Council and its 
possession of the nuclear deterrent – to establish an alternative European 
Intervention Initiative.125 This project, which involves only 10 countries 
(including the UK and Denmark), is designed to bring together EU states 
sharing a common vision regarding security concerns, thereby creating a 
framework for selective cooperation outside the structures of the EU. This 
may be a model to be used elsewhere. 
3. Decoupling 
It is in this framework that the scenario of decoupling – involving the 
outright separation of those Member States favoring more and those favoring 
less integration into two distinct organizations – has also conceptually 
emerged as a possible option for the future.126 The idea that a subset of 
Member States could consolidate their cooperation through separated 
structures outside the EU has led some to suggest that the Eurozone should 
become the framework for the creation of a 'core Europe'.127 In response to 
the euro-crisis, Eurozone states have adopted inter se treaties outside the EU 
legal order to deepen their integration, including by establishing a Euro 
Summit as an ad hoc body grouping the leaders of the Eurozone countries,128 
 
123 Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 Establishing Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating 
Member States,  OJ [2017] L 331/57, Art 3(1). 
124 Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects 
to be developed under PESCO, OJ [2018] L65/24.  
125 French Minister of Defence Florence Parly, speech at the European Council on 
Foreign Relations, Paris, 28 May 2018. 
126 See in particular Sergio Fabbrini, Europe's Future (Cambridge University Press 2019) 
127 See especially Jean-Claude Piris, The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? 
(Cambridge University Press 2012). 
128 See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, 2 March 2012, Art. 12. 
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an ESM to assist failing states,129 and a Single Resolution Fund to support 
failing banks.130 But monetary union requires even greater federalization, 
particularly in order to establish a fiscal capacity, with the connected 
problems of taxation and representation.131 In the future, if efforts to deepen 
and complete EMU were to succeed, therefore, this may lead to the 
consolidation – de facto to the side of the EU, through a web of separate 
international treaties – of a new organization, with its own institutions and 
governance rules for Member States of the Eurozone. In such a scenario, the 
EU27 would not disappear but it would be increasingly shadowed by a 
separate union for a smaller subset of Member States, those which decided 
20 years ago to share a single currency, a hallmark of sovereignty. 
However, the potential ability of the Eurozone to operate as a union within 
the Union faces two limitations. First, not least because Donald Tusk – who 
comes from a non-Eurozone state (Poland) – was in 2014 appointed as 
President of the Euro-Summit, ongoing debates around EMU reform have 
been extended to non-Eurozone countries and are thus now undertaken in an 
inclusive format.132 While this catered to the interests of countries such as 
those of the Hanseatic League – which by involving non-Eurozone countries 
can restrict the dominance of France and Germany on Eurozone matters, 
including their shared ambition to complete EMU – it is clear that this 
weakens the ability of the Eurozone to operate as a platform to promote 
further integration between a core group of states. Second, the attacks of the 
populist Italian government against the EMU institutional architecture and 
fiscal rules suggest that this framework may actually be too inclusive to act as 
the springboard for a renewal of the EU project. As such, the feasibility of a 
scenario in which the Eurozone served to underpin greater integration 
among a subset of Member States is by no means certain, at least in the short 
term. 
 
129 See ESM Treaty (n 18). 
130 See Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund, 21 May 2014. 
131 See further Federico Fabbrini, 'A Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional 
Perspectives', study commissioned by the European Parliament Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, February 2019. 
132 Euro Summit, Leaders' Agenda, 23 March 2018. 
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If this were the case, then, efforts to push for further European integration 
might occur on an even smaller scale. In this regard, the recent conclusion by 
France and Germany of the Treaty of Aachen in January 2019 indicates a 
possible way forward.133 In this bilateral agreement, the two core 
EU/Eurozone Member States committed to deepening their integration at 
all levels, including with the aim of achieving a 'franco-german economic zone 
endowed with common rules.134 In fact, the Treaty also creates a new 
organizational structure for Franco-German cooperation135 and a 
commitment to advance joint proposals on all major European issues.136 
While the Preamble of the Treaty affirms that the two countries are 
interested 'to deepen their cooperation in the field of European policies with 
the aim to favor the unity, effectienss and cohesion of Europe, keeping open 
this cooperation to all Member States of the European Union'137 it is clear 
that it could represent the nucleus of a new Europe, decoupled from the EU, 
to which only a few other like-minded EU Member States could be 
associated. Nonetheless, this scenario has raised concerns, which Germany 
itself has sought to allay,138 suggesting that its feasibility remains uncertain.139  
 
133 See Treaty of Aachen (n 73). 
134 Ibid., Art. 20 (‘zone èconomique franco-allemand dotée de règles communes')(my 
tranlation). 
135 Ibid. Art.s 23-26. 
136 Ibid. Art. 2. 
137 Ibid. Preamble (‘à approfondir leur coopération en matière de politique 
européenne afin de favoriser l'unité, l'efficacité et la cohésion de l'Europe, tout en 
maintenant cette coopération ouverte à tous les États membres de l'Union 
européenne’)(my translation). 
138 See Declaration of the Visegrad Group and the Federal Republic of Germany, 7 
February 2019 (stating that 'There is no place for East–West, North–South, Old–
New divides in the current European Union. [...] Unity is the key'). 
139 But see Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Interview, La Stampa, 1 May 2019 
(stating that 'oggi ci sono già tre Europe, ma fingiamo sia soltanto una [today there 
are already three Europes, but we pretend it is only one')(my translation) and 
Bundestag President Wolfgang Schauble, Interview, Le Monde, 26 May 2019 
(stating that 'nous devons aller plus loin que le Traité de Lisbonne afin de render 
l'Europe plus efficace [we need to go beyond the Lisbon Treaty with the aim to 
make Europe more effective]')(my translation). 
 




This article has analyzed three scenarios for the future of Europe beyond 
Brexit. As pointed out, while the EU 27 have been remarkably united in 
negotiating with the UK, they are heavily divided among themselves on 
crucial issues like EMU, migration and respect for foundational EU values. 
In fact, the euro-crisis, the migration crisis and the worsening rule of law 
backsliding in a number of EU Member States have left deep scars in the 
fabric of the EU. While rhetorical efforts have been made at the highest EU 
institutional level to chart a united way forward for the EU27 post-Brexit, 
Europe remains fractured along regional and political cleavages, as reflected 
in the the EP election. In this context, this article has outlined alternative 
scenarios for the future of Europe. As suggested, while the influence of path 
dependency in the functioning of the EU cannot be minimized, greater 
differentiation could become an inevitable response to Europe's current 
challenges. In fact, one cannot even exclude the possibility that, step by step, 
a new, separate organization of integration may emerge alongside the EU – 
either around the Eurozone or a smaller alliance of states championed by 
France and Germany, along the lines of the Treaty of Aachen – following a 
logic of outright decoupling.  
None of these scenarios may be appealing for the future of Europe. An EU 
that simply muddles though the current difficulties will fail to address the 
citizens' calls for change,140 made clear in the recent EP elections, a prospect 
which could be deleterious for the EU in the long-term, given citizens' 
growing expectations from, and scrutiny of, the EU.141 Yet, if incrementalism 
may have reached its limits, an EU that differentiates with ever growing 
frequency will run into challenges of its own,142 while the creation of an inner 
core of Member States pursuing deeper integration through a parallel 
organization would put an expensive geopolitical price-tag on the road 
 
140 See Ronan McCrea, 'Forward or Back: The Future of European Integration and 
the Impossibility of the Status Quo' (2017) 23 European Law Journal 66. 
141 See Catherine de Vries, Euroskepticism and the Future of European Integration (Oxford 
University Press 2018). 
142  See Bruno de Witte, 'The Law as Tool and Constraint of Differentiated 
Integration' EUI RSCAS Working Paper No 47/2019. 
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toward European federalism.143 Nonetheless, this scenario could become a 
more attractive option if, for instance, the UK extends its membership of the 
EU for much longer, creating a greater need to differentiate tiers of 
membership internally.144 In the end, the future of Europe remains to be 
written, but whatever happens with Brexit and the future relations between 
the EU and the UK, one can expect that the question of Europe's finalitè, and 
the consequential issue of its institutional set-up, will occupy the energy and 
attention of the EU27 in the near future.145 
 
143 See Hannes Hoffmeiser (ed), The End of the Ever Closer Union? (Nomos 2018) 
144 See Fabbrini and Schmidt in this volume. 
145 See also European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen, 'A Union 
that Strives for More: My Agenda for Europe.' Political Guidelines for the Next 
European Commission 2019-2024, 16 July 2019, 19 (calling for a Conference on the 
Future of Europe in 2020 and indicating opens to Treaty change to reform the EU 
democratic architecture). 
